Talk:Battle of Waterloo

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Good articleBattle of Waterloo has been listed as one of the Warfare good articles under the good article criteria. If you can improve it further, please do so. If it no longer meets these criteria, you can reassess it.
Article milestones
DateProcessResult
March 30, 2007WikiProject peer reviewReviewed
September 21, 2007Good article nomineeListed
May 10, 2008Featured article candidateNot promoted
Current status: Good article

This article is selected for Wikipedia:Selected anniversaries/June 18

Page views[edit]

That decisive word again[edit]

Grateful though I am to read others' opinions, I will avoid the edit war bait and answer MarcusBritish here. Infobox guidelines are to avoid 'decisive' and similar terms. 'Victory' will do, with any elaboration possible in a note or the body of the article, where such terms better belong. The WP guidelines, [1], are there for a reason, not to be ignored without very clear reason, which in this case does not exist. Decisive victory is an established fact. Established by whom? Yourself? Sounds like a POV to me. Term widely used on Wikipedia. Does this make it right? Removal is vexatious? Do you mean any editor who edits in line with WP guidelines is being vexatious, or just editors with a different opinion from yours? A Pyrrhic victory can be decisive too. What has this got to do with topic of debate? I suggest we take that unnecessary word out of the infobox, as with other similar battle articles, such as [2] Roger 8 Roger (talk) 04:24, 2 July 2018 (UTC)

WP:IAR. "I suggest we take that unnecessary word out of the infobox" – unnecessary according to whom? Yourself? Sounds like a POV to me. As for "Decisive victory" – Read the title of this book. I'd suggest you leave military history to those who understand it rather than trying to whitewash Wikipedia with so-called guidelines that reek of revisionism. There are no fixed rules here. I find it curious that of the dozens of articles which use "non-standard" terms in the Result parameter, you chose to target this particular one. Any editor who is truly concerned about the widespread use of such terms would find as many articles as they can and edit them all to make them adhere to guidelines. I would consider that disruptive editing, personally. And since you have not done so, I suspect you would also. Seriously, take some advice, don't treat guidelines as law and try to enforce them without good reason, it tends to get under other editors' skin. Also, the irrelevant discussion you linked at the Coords board was 9 years ago... do you really think once Wikipedia creates guidelines they stick forever? If you genuinely want to remove terms from Result infoboxes across all military history battle articles, take it to the MILHIST board and start a fresh discussion. I see no need to single-out this highly-viewed article, as has clearly been done. Nothing is going to be gained here. — Marcus(talk) 11:20, 2 July 2018 (UTC)

Those who are interested in this conversation might like to see the RfC at Module talk:Infobox military conflict/Archive 4#Request for comment -- PBS (talk) 21:37, 30 August 2018 (UTC)

Prior to Waterloo Napoleon had been rampaging all over Europe. After Waterloo he wasn't. He was in fact confined to an island in the South Atlantic. That's pretty decisive.
Waterloo decided that Napoleon's time as France's Emperor was over. Permanently. That's decisive. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 95.149.55.42 (talk) 10:30, 8 March 2019 (UTC)
Honestly, if I had my way, I'd remove the ever to be damned result box altogether. I give you the Battle of Borodino, where the French lost just shy of 100k men, mostly without a shot being fired. Then proceed to "win" the battle and lose another 35k over two days, then march out and lose another 70k on the way out. Yea! We won? This was definitive as a win but for the most part, the reader is far better served by reading the aftermath section.Tirronan (talk) 16:10, 7 September 2019 (UTC)

Sourcing and POV issues in Historical importance section[edit]

The section "Historical importance", is poorly sourced and possibly violates WP:POV:

  • The first two sentences of the first paragraph are supported by two refs to works by Barbero. The first is tagged (full citation needed) and does not specify which of the three works by Barbero listed in the bibliography is being referenced. The second is a somewhat ambiguous quote which does not make clear who is being referred to by "Most...would have agreed", or the identify the French writer who is making the statement that this majority is agreeing with. I only have snippet view of that text, so if this clarified elsewhere, that could be usefully added to the quote.
  • The rest of that paragraph is not sourced at all.

The second paragraph is sourced to:

  • A New York Times book review. Are we seriously sourcing one of the most famous battles in European history to a book review?
  • An article published by History Today which focuses on other key events of 1815, not about Waterloo. Waterloo is mentioned seven times, none of them supporting any of the statements made in this para.
  • An article Published on the Wharton University blog that focuses mostly on America. It is the source for the last sentence of the para only, which focusses only on the bicentenery and trans-atlantic peace, and does not support any of the preceding statements in that para.

The remaining sources have, for some reason, been consigned to a footnote, and comprise the following three which are not specifically focussed on the battle itself:

  • Kennedy's The rise and fall of the great powers: economic change and military conflict from 1500 to 2000. Can't verify the actual quote or it's context because Gbooks snippet view is being coy. Aren't there better sources with a more focussed scope in time and subject than the half millenia covered by this book?
  • Gbooks snippet view is not so coy when searching for the text "disturbance comparable" in Palmer's (somewhat dated) A History of the Modern World The source in full, including the text trimmed out of the article, reads, "No international disturbance comparable in magnitude to that created by the French Revolution and Napoleonic empire has ever been followed by such a protracted period of peace." That in itself does not make any statement about Waterloo.
  • Similarly, Paxton does not explicitly connect the recovery in transatlantic commerce from six decades of abnormal obstacles after Waterloo as a consequence of that battle. He would have had to say, "because of Waterloo" for that to be the case.

More relevant sources which focus specifically on Waterloo are less emphatic about the importance of the battle:

  • Glover's Waterloo: Myth and Reality states on p. xi, "The campaign did not end with the fighting at Waterloo, for Napoleon could have reformed an army within France and fought on. Therefore the campaign to take Paris and the fortress war that went on for many months after Napoleon's abdication, along with details of his surrender and the peace settlement and subsequent allied occupation of France, are all essential to a full understanding of this campaign and its far-reaching consequences."
  • Alan Forrest, Emeritus Professor of Modern History at the University of York states on p. 6 of his book, Waterloo, "In German eyes, Leipzig was the really significant encounter, the moment which signalled Napoleon's defeat...Leipzig, not Waterloo, would remain the vital battle for Germany and for Europe" and "For most Frenchmen, however [Waterloo] was not the turning point of the Napoleonic Wars. That had come earlier, in the Peninsular War, during the Russian campaign, or at Leipzig."
  • Profesor Sir Richard Evans's made a number of relevant observations in his 2015 lecture, Waterloo: Causes, Courses and Consequences. He asserted, for example, that "...if peace was restored, and there were no major wars in Europe for a century, until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, this was not achieved solely or even principally by the Battle of Waterloo."

If we're going to give a balanced view of the scholarly opinion on the significance of the battle, then these viewpoints need to be researched and added to the article. Factotem (talk) 15:46, 4 September 2018 (UTC)

Your last three sources sound very much like the authors were striving to be both controversial and revisionist. This is the bane of modern scholarship, axe-grinding should be flagged when it goes against the consensus of a couple of centuries of historical writing. Urselius (talk) 17:49, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
What Evans writes is largely true (although as this is not his period and he makes some obvious mistakes eg: "Arthur Wellesley, born in 1869 and so at that time in his mid-fifties," whoops! and he bases his argument on selected secondary sources. From some of what he writes, it is obvious that he has a passing knowledge of what and what was, and was not, modus operandi for Napoleon when it came to battles and the graphic constraints that the battlefield imposed on the French.
Waterloo was not a turning point, and yes Leipzig (Battle of the Nations) can also be seen as a significant (even more so from a German national bias) -- as can other battles during the long war. The point is not that Waterloo won the war that had lasted a quarter of a century on its own, but what it did was stop the war continuing and in that sense it was decisive (as well as being a decisive tactical victory) which is a point that Evans makes.
If Napoleon had been more energised after the battle of Ligny and done to the Prussians that night what they did to his army two days later, and then in the early morning of the the 17th June hit Wellington in his left flank while he was held in place by Ney, then Napoleon would have won the opening round of the 1815 campaign. However those would victories not have been strategically decisive (although they would have ranked along side the Six Days' Campaign as an example of his military genius). Glovers points are well made (but unless one knows a lot about the campaign, misleading, as Napoleon abdicated within four days and the fighting by field armies was over within thee weeks (none of the later engagements involved more than part of a division), and Glover's summation does not contradict the general historical consensus. That Waterloo was the decisive battle of the Waterloo Campaign and with the end of the campaign as Evans writes came the peace dividend: "Between them, therefore, the Concert of Europe and the British domination of the seas ensured that the nineteenth century, after 1815, was a century of peace in Europe". -- PBS (talk) 20:24, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
Factotem I am interested to know whether you are playing devils advocate, or if you genuinely think that the battle of Waterloo was not decisive, and if you do, have you have come to that conclusion using the methods used by an Objective historian (which are based on the criteria put forward by Sir Richard Evans)? -- PBS (talk) 20:24, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
I have no idea whether or not the Battle of Waterloo was decisive. It would be nice to educate myself about that here, but as I point out above, I have grave doubts that this is the place to do so. Not only is there some shockingly bad sourcing here, on a subject that should be rife with scholarly sources, my own relatively cursory search has revealed what seem to be me scholarly viewpoints that are completely ignored. I would say to User:Urselius that WP:AGE MATTERS; Glover's Waterloo: Myth and Reality is already used as a source in the article, as are two other works by him; and both Forrest and Evans have impressive academic credentials. I would also ask if there are any sources that support the assertion that these three authors are controversial, revisionist and/or axe-grinding? Obviously I'm here as a result of the infobox debate. This is yet another example where nuance is an issue that precludes over-simplification, as opposed to appropriate simplification, of the result in the infobox. Factotem (talk) 20:49, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
I think that it has to be uppermost in the mind that the states of Europe declared war on Napoleon personally, not on the French nation as such, remarkable as this is. I think it is impossible to avoid the fact that the outcome of Waterloo was the prime cause of Napoleon's precipitate second abdication. With Napoleon politically nullified by this action (the minor humming and hawing about the King of Rome succeeding is of no real account) the entire casus belli for the war disappears. If that is not a decisive result of a battle, then there have never been decisive battles, ever. Urselius (talk) 21:12, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
And yes. I did see that at the end Evans does say that Waterloo was indeed decisive, but there's that use of an adjective that I've talked about before, and the analysis he goes into indicates that it's more complex than that. More importantly, though, and irrespective of the infobox debate, can anyone disagree that this article is sadly lacking a credible treatment of the battle's impact? Factotem (talk) 21:03, 4 September 2018 (UTC)
The problem is that Waterloo so entered the collective psyche of Europe as a fundamentally pivotal moment is history, that an understanding of this was taken for granted. Finding a concise treatment of the after-effects of the battle is therefore relatively difficult. Urselius (talk) 21:12, 4 September 2018 (UTC)

I would add that had Blucher failed to support Wellington's Army and both of their forces been forced to retire along their lines of communication, Napoleon could have once again been in a dominant position in Europe. The historical significance of Waterloo was in preventing what might have happened rather than what actually did happen. Authors that want to rake over events of 200 years previously might want to consider why they chose to rake over those particular events. 90.248.201.121 (talk) 09:28, 4 June 2019 (UTC)

I don't think we need to concern ourselves with "What if..." speculation. History is about what did happen, not what might have happened. Mediatech492 (talk) 16:44, 4 June 2019 (UTC)

Attack of Imperial Guard[edit]

In my view, this is the weakest section of the article. Was the Guard attack actually so much of a danger?

I'm happy to see credit given to the Dutch and General Chasse. But the sources given to support the idea that the line was really in danger of breaking seem to be a 1909 Dutch history. This is rather old (!) and from a particularly nationalistic period of historical writing.

The statement attributed to Marshall Ney (which is contemporaneous) is surely right. The Guard was simply too weak to break the line unless they did so very quickly. They also attacked in formations (squares) which were least likely to break a line which outnumbered them. (If Napoleon himself ordered this, he must have done so on the basis that they were likely to be attacked by cavalry, as he had seen done to D'Erlon. But even if his remaining cavalry was blown, they could nonetheless have offered flank protection to columns). While the Brunswickers did retire, and the 30th and 73rd Foot gave ground, Wellington rallied them (and then returned to Maitland's Guards). The Prince of Orange had been wounded about half an hour earlier (when Ney had asked for, and been refused, reinforcements for the centre).

--Markd999 (talk) 23:24, 7 September 2018 (UTC)

The Guard were fresh and most of the units they were sent against were anything but fresh. This is a big advantage in a battle of attrition, such as Waterloo was. Also, the Guard were as fearsome as their reputation suggested; anyone doubting the capabilities of the Old/Middle Guard need only look at how only two of their battalions recaptured Plancenoit at bayonet-point during Waterloo. Urselius (talk) 07:51, 8 September 2018 (UTC)


Both points are valid. Tired and worn-down units would be at a psychological disadvantage to fresh troops (see the 30th and 73rd inching back), and might well break at bayonet-point even to lesser numbers. But the psychological disadvantage was greatly reduced by the fact that the Guard advanced in battalion squares, rather than en masse, and as long as the troops opposing them stood and fired, this formation made it virtually impossible to reach them with the bayonet.

I'm not familiar with Dutch historiography of the battle, but the 1909 source for their contribution does manifestly include episodes which took place before the Guard were sent forward (the wounding of the Prince, for example), and even recent and decent British historians seem to miss it out, which is not now likely on nationalistic grounds. I think what has happened is that historians (and novelists, and Napoleon) have liked to imagine that - because the repulse of the Guard set off the final French collapse - that an Allied collapse at this point might equally have happened. But it was not so dramatically symmetrical. It would be a help if this passage could benefit from recent Dutch scholarship.

Markd999 (talk) 21:58, 8 September 2018 (UTC)

I suppose that you mean by the "1909 Dutch source" Bas, F de; Wommersom, J. De T'Serclaes de (1909), La campagne de 1815 aux Pays-Bas d'après les rapports officiels néerlandais, volumes: I: Quatre-Bras. II: Waterloo. III: Annexes and notes. IV: supplement: maps and plans, Brussels: Librairie Albert de Wit? As the title suggests this source contains in vol. III a number of not previously published archivalia, among others Dutch after-battle reports. So this book is actually better sourced than a lot of the other books and sources in the article. It may be that there is a "nationalistic bias", but hey, if one compares this to the many 19th-century British books about the subject, is this not a bit like the pot calling the kettle black? In any case the book lays a number of Siborne's libels to rest (speaking of "nationalist bias"). The reason why this book has not made much of an impression in the Anglophone historiography may be that (to my knowledge) it has never been translated into English, which was probably too high a bar for British historians.--Ereunetes (talk) 23:54, 6 April 2019 (UTC)

"Siborne's libels" accurately reflect the opinions of the British officers who were his sources. Siborne was not an eyewitness, but as a junior member of the army of occupation in 1815 he would have been in an ideal position to gain recent first-hand accounts. He later solicited extensive correspondence from eyewitnesses, but only from British and ex-King's German Legion officers. If you, as I have done, compare Siborne's history and the texts of the letters he received then there is an obvious correlation between them. If Siborne is accused of bias, then the officers he relied on for information must also be accused, en masse, of equal bias. In an ideal world Siborne would have attempted to gain accounts from Dutch-Belgian, Brunswicker, French etc. sources, but he wasn't aiming his book at anything but a British audience. Back projection of modern ideas of historical probity onto a mid-nineteenth century writer is not only inappropriate it is downright silly. Urselius (talk) 10:44, 7 April 2019 (UTC)
Call me silly then, but I am not alone in that respect. David Hamilton-Williams, whose "Hamilton-Williams, David (1993), Waterloo. New Perspectives. The Great Battle Reappraised, London: Arms & Armour Press, ISBN 978-0-471-05225-8" is one of the references with the article and who is cited at several places, spends his "Introduction: Captain William Siborne" on deprecating the work of Siborne. It may be true that many of the officers who replied to his questionnaire were critical about the conduct of the Dutch-Belgian troops but hey, what else is new about the opinions of British soldiers about their allies throughout the ages? For instance, in contemporary literature about the Anglo-Russian invasion of Holland of 1799 everything that went wrong was deemed the fault of the Russians. So I don't think one should give too much credence to what British soldiers have to say about foreigners; I think their xenophobia is more or less "innate". I would have been surprised if they would have had any praise for their allies. In any case, I gladly refer you to the chapter I just referred to in Hamilton-Williams' book to answer your argument. He also points out that the foreign criticism of Siborne's "history" was immediate, so what I wrote is not just "...Back projection of modern ideas of historical probity ", it just reflects what proper historians (though mostly not British historians) have thought since the 1840s.--Ereunetes (talk) 19:49, 9 April 2019 (UTC)
Unfortunately, Hamilton-Williams (not his real name) has been widely discredited as a historian for falsifying sources. If you look up his name and 'primary sources' the whole sorry history will become apparent. The furore surrounding H-W was in part the reason for his publisher 'Arms and Armour' going out of business. I have tried hard to get references to the works of H-W and Hofschroer (guilty of similar falsifications and other misdemeanours) to be removed from the article, with no success hereto. I would reiterate that they are fundamentally unreliable. Urselius (talk) 20:32, 9 April 2019 (UTC)
There is nothing so convincing as a good old argumentum ad hominem. Did Hamilton-Williams also kick his dog and beat his wife? In any case, I am sure he did not falsify his sources in the book I referred to. He uses the work of François de Bas this discussion started about extensively, and other than your hero Siborne, he used reputable primary sources. So I am glad that you did not succeed in your exercise in censorship. I think your problem is that you are unable to read foreign languages, like the French of the book I am talking about. Originally, the citation in the article (it was a cite web, originally) contained a link to the Google Books version of the book, so anybody who was able to read French, would be able to judge for his or her self.--Ereunetes (talk) 00:40, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
If you are happy to use the work of a discredited historian, who it has been shown invented primary sources in his book 'Waterloo: New Perspectives', then there is little anyone can usefully say to you. If a historian is capable of inventing sources then any opinions he or she presents have to be treated with extreme caution, if not rejected out of hand. Your position seems entirely false; if Siborne is damned for not consulting all available sources, then H-W should be doubly damned for falsifying sources. I have a working knowledge of French - out of necessity, I translated 3 old scientific papers (dating to the late 1970s) from French into English some years ago - though even the French tend to write science in English these days. Urselius (talk) 12:24, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
Also, 19th century British military xenophobia was far from universal. British military figures praised the Portuguese soldiers in the Peninsular War, one calling them 'the fighting cocks of the army'; the Sikhs and Gurkhas gained a high reputation in Britain for bravery and martial prowess. This also extended to some enemies, no-one could doubt the contemporary British admiration for the bravery of the Zulu and Maori warriors. Urselius (talk) 20:53, 9 April 2019 (UTC)
Humbug and bullfeathers, there were numerous accounts of the "cowardly Dutch" thought you don't see it in modern historians, thank God. But, there are enough old histories out there that you can follow the patch if you care to. Part of the problem with using Silborne too much. Personally, I prefer Chesney. The Guard was not going to break through, 5 battalions were either in Placinoit, the Woods south of Placinoit, or close by acting as a reserve for the rest of the Guard at Placinoit. What it the Guard's attach did do was use up the last reserve available to Nappy at that point of the battle, after the Guard retreated there was nothing left to plug a breach in the French line.Tirronan (talk) 03:39, 10 April 2019 (UTC)
Uxbridge/Anglesey bracketed two cavalry officers for censure in his published correspondence, the colonel of the Hanoverian Cumberland Hussars and the brigadier commanding the Dutch-Belgian heavy cavalry. The first officer was court-martialled and dismissed from the Hanoverian service. The ADC sent to order, unsuccessfully, the Cumberland Hussars not to quit the field (they fled towards Brussels) was the same man who pointed out to Uxbridge that the Dutch-Belgian heavies were not following him as he tried to lead them in a charge (as related in his own published correspondence). We are faced with a number of questions. Were both Uxbridge and his ADC lying about the behaviour of the Dutch-Belgian heavies? Were they lying about the Dutch-Belgian heavies, but truthful about the Cumberland Hussars? Was the colonel of the Cumberland Hussars cashiered because he was a subject of the King of England (as King of Hanover) and the Dutch-Belgian brigadier not cashiered because he was a subject of an ally? What motivation would Uxbridge and his ADC have to lie about the behaviour of the Dutch-Belgian heavies? What motivation would the Dutch-Belgian cavalry officers (and subsequent Dutch or Belgian historians) have to gloss over a very inglorious incident (if Uxbridge and his ADC etc. were not lying)? Do modern historians shy away from mentioning the incident due to the pressure to be politically correct, to fall in with revisionist tendencies and avoid being labelled as jingoistic? I cannot help thinking that a commander-in-chief of cavalry would have retained a very sharp memory of trying to induce a brigade of cavalry under his command (the Prince of Orange placed them under Uxbridge's command a few days before Waterloo) to charge and being unsuccessful, while the officers of this formation would have a great deal of inducement to forget that the incident ever happened. Urselius (talk) 11:31, 10 April 2019 (UTC)
Wellington would be surprised: in his dispatch after the Battle of Waterloo he singled out Uxbridge's Bête Noire, the Dutch general Trip by name for praise (one of only two Dutch officers; the other's name is probably misspelled, but Wellington may have intended to mention Chassé). So I think we should forget this old chestnut. The article does the right thing and does not take sides in this controversy.--Ereunetes (talk) 00:40, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
Wellington was writing immediately after the battle and was evidently unaware of all that had occurred. Von Hacke of the Cumberland Hussars was not immediately arrested, some considerable time passed before he was placed under arrest. In the end either Anglesey and Seymour, his ADC, were lying or Trip disobeyed a direct order from his commanding officer in battle, there is no middle ground here. Urselius (talk) 08:06, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
The main reason why the Guard failed in the final charge, was because Zeitan's Prussians broke through the French line on Wellington's left flank, and their cavalry were streaming across the field behind the Guard as they advanced on the British/Dutch line. The Guard obviously noticed this, realised that their attack was now pointless, and tried to get back before the Prussians could seal off their escape. See Chesney and Uffindell, as cited in the last paragraph of "Zieten's flank march". British histories tend to gloss over this by saying "at about the same time" the Prussians also broke through, but these two sources make it clear that the Prussians were through the French line in force while the Guard attack was still in progress. Interesting, no?
A bit of context always helps. The Cumberland Hussars were all volunteers, with little training or experience, who largely spoke no English. It was recognised at the time, as well as at a subsequent enquiry, that they were never battle-ready, but they were dragged in anyway. They were held in reserve for most of Waterloo, but took heavy casualties from artillery fire through the day, and Von Hacke himself was wounded. Some of them fled to Brussels, but most retired in good order. Von Hacke was eventually court-martialled on the repeated request of his own officers. The regiment was eventually disbanded, but was never officially accused of misconduct as a unit.
Re the Dutch-Belgian cavalry, there are actually acres of middle ground. Perhaps the order to charge was a stupid order, and the cavalry officers knew better than the British staff officer? Perhaps the cavalry had been ordered to hold their position "no matter what", and the British staff officer was ordering them to disobey the standing orders of a higher ranking commander? Perhaps there was simply a language problem – it seems to have happened quite frequently in that campaign? Perhaps modern historians shy away from mentioning the incident because the matter was merely a simple misunderstanding? Perhaps modern historians shy away from mentioning the incident because the British staff officer had stuffed up on the day, and they are protecting the British brand rather than the Dutch brand?
The cavalry in question had served valiantly during the battle, and their commander was praised by his superiors for his performance – why should we assume that they had failed "ingloriously" in this particular incident? On the other hand, senior British officers lied shamelessly, including Wellington himself, whenever they thought it prudent to do so. Perhaps the British staff officer in question had "a great deal of inducement" to "misremember" that incident?
Wdford (talk) 11:41, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
All the Dutch-Belgian cavalry had been placed under the command of Uxbridge. Any brigadier who is unable to recognise his commander-in-chief deserves cashiering. There was precisely one lieutenant general of cavalry in the Anglo-allied army, Uxbridge was also the deputy commander of the whole army, so must have been well known to the officers. There were very few general officers of British hussars on the field, so even his uniform should have been a bit of a give-away. I think that not recognising him or misunderstanding him is not a valid defence. So you think that Uxbridge and his ADC had sufficient incentive to lie, and lie publicly. What could that incentive possibly be? Remember that at the time calumny on this sort of scale could result in a duel, and Uxbridge certainly duelled. The idea that Uxbridge and his ADC colluded, years after the event, to concoct a spurious incident is simply ridiculous. Their accounts of the Dutch heavies and the Cumberland Hussars are related in letters in much the same manner, if they were accurate in condemning the latter, why should their condemnation of the former be any less truthful? The defence of the D-B heavies is often based on accounts of them conducting successful charges during the battle, but it does not exonerate them in the specific circumstances related by Uxbridge and his ADC. The D-B heavies had just witnessed Uxbridge lead the Household Brigade in a charge against Ney's belated combined arms attack, and them be halted and driven off by musketry, much depleted. In this circumstance the reluctance of the D-Bs is understandable, but it does not excuse disobeying the order of a superior officer in action. Urselius (talk) 13:07, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

I think there are better usages for this article than throwing various nationalities under the bus. Given the number of accounts on other allied contingents by British officers that were proven wrong. There were Prussian cavalry units so poorly trained that if they started a charge they literally couldn't stop. Prussian artillery fought so poorly that Clausewitz was complaining that it cost the army the battle at Ligny. I assure you it wasn't fighting any better at Waterloo. Two Prussian musketeer battalions were so unimpressed with the Old Guard unit facing them they drove it off at bayonet point. In this article as it sits right now, we have 1st Corps arriving 2 hours later then it did. All that is untalked about in the article. Find something better to support.Tirronan (talk) 16:08, 11 April 2019 (UTC)

I never thought that Trip failed to recognise Uxbridge, merely that he may have had good reason to ignore him – assuming that Uxbridge's subsequent claims on this point were fully accurate and truthful to begin with. It has also been noted that a number of misunderstandings occurred that day due to the language barrier. I have not seen any source stating that Trip spoke good English, far less that Uxbridge spoke any Dutch.
Both would have spoken French, Trip was an officer in the French army for a time and all English gentlemen were taught French, along with dancing, as a required social accomplishment. Urselius (talk) 08:57, 12 April 2019 (UTC)
Trip wasn't British, and Uxbridge was only his temporary coalition commander – who had manifestly failed to impress his subordinates with his performance and judgement. Trip's brigade was one of the units that had to rescue the British cavalry after Uxbridge lead a huge charge off into the distance, where he lost control of his force, they ruined their horses and they nearly got wiped out. Then the D-B cavalry watched the same Uxbridge lead the survivors off on another mindless cavalry charge against a superior French column and get shredded, and now here the man is again, demanding that the D-B's follow him in yet another hare-brained cannon-fodder charge. Any rational officer would have told Uxbridge to eff off, and presumably Dutch generals were promoted for their ability to think rationally. Montgomery repeatedly disobeyed Eisenhower in Normandy, so why judge Trip any more harshly – especially when Uxbridge was clearly wrong?
What incentive might Uxbridge have had to lie about things thereafter? Well, he had spent much of the day pointlessly feeding Allied cavalry units into the shredder, and he ended the day by getting his own leg blown off. Perhaps, once he recovered from the surgery, he was feeling a bit defensive?
Wdford (talk) 21:05, 11 April 2019 (UTC)
In an allied army the chain of command of necessity cuts across national military boundaries. There are cases of subordinates attempting to evade orders to conserve their commands. At Waterloo a cavalry corps commander attempted to keep the carabinier brigade out of Ney's grand charges, by positioning them in low ground out of sight. However, when Ney became aware of their existence, the corps, divisional and brigade commanders involved obeyed orders and committed the carabiniers to the charge. This is a very different scenario than disobeying a direct order, like Trip. You omit to mention that the charge of the British heavies, a mere two brigades, routed the attack of a whole infantry corps, and a brigade of cuirassiers! There is plenty of evidence that the British heavies were not 'nearly wiped out' - the officers of the Union Brigade and a KGL Hussar officer (describing the Scots Greys) recorded that each regiment was reorganised from three to two squadrons after the charge. Six squadrons of cavalry is not a negligible force. I notice that Barbero, an Italian and therefore without a nationalistic axe to grind, describes the Trip and Uxbridge affair with no caveats as to the truthfulness of the Uxbridge/Seymour accounts. Urselius (talk) 08:57, 12 April 2019 (UTC)
Barbero, an Italian and therefore without a nationalistic axe to grind, describes the British heavy cavalry as having been effectively wiped out in the grand charge, as do many other sources, although obviously some troopers did survive to fight on – mainly due to having been rescued by the light cavalry units and the much-maligned "D-B heavies". The subsequent counter-charges were undertaken largely by the light cavalry units and the much-maligned "D-B heavies". Some charges were undertaken by some heavy brigade units too, seemingly those units that had been kept in reserve during the "glorious" main charge. Of the Uxbridge charge just before the Trip incident, Siborne describes the Household Brigade as being "so much reduced in numbers" that this attack failed. Barbero says of this event that: "The few remaining squadrons of the Household Brigade were sent forward in yet another disastrous charge, after which they were obliged to form up in the rear, deployed in one line instead of two, in order to make an impression". No wonder Trip was unimpressed with the cannon-fodder decisions of Uxbridge, and declined to participate in his antics.
Barbero describes the Trip incident very briefly indeed, and passes no judgement on Trip. Siborne is a bit more hyperbolic, but then Siborne makes no effort to hide his hero-worship of Uxbridge, and we have already discussed the bias of Siborne's sources. Ney's commanders were all French, as far as I can tell, not coalition troops, so this comparison is a bit weak. Wellington's army was largely non-British, and some units (such as Trip's brigade) had been part of the French army opposing the British not long before Waterloo, so had not yet been indoctrinated into the British attitude of blindly obeying stupid orders. Back projection of modern ideas of coalition chains of command onto mid-nineteenth century officers is not only inappropriate, it is downright silly.[User:Wdford|Wdford]] (talk) 09:10, 13 April 2019 (UTC)
No, I have to take exception to virtually everything you have said. The Prince of Orange had placed the D/B cavalry under Uxbridge's orders. This means that they had no wiggle-room whatsoever if given a direct order from Uxbridge. Trip, in disobeying a direct order on the field of battle, should have been cashiered like the commander of the Cumberland Hussars. Also you are just parroting uninformed historians and have no concept of the physiology of horses if you think that cavalry cannot recover their ability to make an effective charge given an hour or more of rest. Urselius (talk) 11:48, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
I'm not sure why you waited 5 months to continue this thread, but fine.
Commanders ALWAYS have wriggle-room - that is the difference between commanders and sheep. Trip was on the scene, unlike you and Siborne, he had observed Uxbridge in all his rampant stupidity throughout the day, he had carried out one rescue already, and maybe he was able to see clearly that Uxbridge was suffering from heat-stroke - which the hero-worshipping Siborne somehow failed to report? Maybe Trip just realized that Uxbridge had completely lost the plot, and he exercised his discretion as a general officer. Maybe, like the Commonwealth commanders in the Western Desert in 1941, he had privately been told by his government to not allow incompetent British generals to use his men as cannon fodder, and he knew that his government would back him up - perhaps that is why he was never court-martialed for this? For the invasion of Normandy in 1944, Churchill placed Montgomery under the direct command of Eisenhower, but yet Montgomery repeatedly ignored and disobeyed Ike, and Ike was powerless to fire a coalition general without the intervention of Brooke - who was Monty's direct commander, but also his biggest patron and protector-at-large. The Cumberland Hussars, on the other hand, were technically British troops, and were forced to accept cannon-fodder orders.
No, the Cumberland Hussars were troops of the Kingdom of Hanover. Hanover and Gt. Britain were in personal union; though their kings were the same person, there was no unity of military structures. When William IV died, his niece Victoria, under British law, inherited the British throne; however, Salic Law operated in Hanover, and his brother Ernest, Duke of Cumberland became king of Hanover, thus breaking the personal union. The wiggle room of army commanders from different nations overseeing complex campaigns when in alliance, is somewhat different to the situation of a brigade or divisional commander being given a direct order while actually in combat, as the cannon-balls were flying. Urselius (talk) 08:32, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I don't understand your remark about "uninformed historians" - I am referring to Barbero, whom you introduced into this debate, and Siborne, who despite his naked bias is hardly "uninformed".
"Uninformed" in this context - they have swallowed the received wisdom about the destruction of the British heavies uncritically and have not examined the eyewitness accounts written by the men of the heavy cavalry (mostly officers) about what happened in the charge and what the regiments did subsequently. Such uninformed historians include Barbero and Chandler, otherwise well-respected authorities. Urselius (talk) 08:32, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I likewise don't see the relevance of your comments about the physiology of horses. The ability of a horse to recover from a hard gallop depends on many things - the strength and condition of the individual animal, how well it has been fed in recent weeks, how hard it has had to work in recent actions and journeys to get to this battlefield, the weather on the day and the condition of the ground underfoot, the weight and skill of its rider, the topography over which it had to charge, the speed and distance of the charge itself, the availability of water and shade etc in the hours prior to the charge, and the availability of water and shade etc during the recovery phase. These horses were probably far from optimally conditioned. In addition to physical exhaustion, horses also suffer from nervous exhaustion - just like humans do. Horses are very sensitive to loud noise - their ears are much more sensitive than humans, who also suffer from shell-shock and concussion etc - and horses are herbivores who really don't like the smell of blood. Nonetheless, my points earlier were actually that the British cavalry had been depleted by losses, not just by wearing out their horses - as is clearly stated by both of these "well-informed" sources.
Please clarify your point/s? Wdford (talk) 15:24, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
We are talking about trained war-horses. Whatever other deficiencies they had, the British cavalry had good horseflesh and were well trained in individual combat. Horses were inured to gunshots, loud noises in general and otherwise disturbing sights, smells and movements by careful graduated exposure. If they had not been so trained they would have been useless on campaign, despite harsh bits and spurs. Urselius (talk) 08:32, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
Still wrong. I accept that one does not encourage a corporal to question orders, however insane they may seem, but generals ALWAYS have the right – and in fact the responsibility – to apply their own judgement. Especially when the cannon-balls were flying, and especially if the incompetent senior officer was ordering them to lead their men into the path of the cannon-balls for no good reason. Based on the situation as it stood before him, and the poor performance of Uxbridge on the day, Trip would have been irresponsible to obey the order to commit his men to yet another moronic suicidal charge. Your insistence that Trip should have been punished for refusing to obey a clearly-stupid order is most curious. The person who should have been cashiered that day was Uxbridge. Probably he was saved by his wounds, by his title, by his reputation and by the fact that the British Army usually rewarded incompetent generals with knighthoods and promotions when they messed up horribly – even as late as WW2.
It is also interesting that you regard the recognised authorities as "uninformed" when they disagree with your POV, but accept that they are wonderful sources when they agree with you. A defensive primary source insisting that his squadron had still been effective, is not the same as a secondary source with a better perspective and less of a personal bent - hence the general requirement to use secondary sources.
Military horses and mules etc were trained to tolerate artillery and the screams of mutilated stable-mates, but no horse – or human – can ever be "inured" by "exposure". Too much exposure leads to shell-shock and/or PTSD in humans, and animals are now known to be very sensitive as well. Read up a bit more.
Animals can be conditioned - I am a zoologist. Urselius (talk) 19:15, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
If you have been "conditioning" animals by subjecting them to painfully loud noises and the smell of fresh blood, then you better hope the RSPCA is not reading this thread. Wdford (talk) 20:42, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
Urselius actually only stated and shared knowledge of such an existence, which I'm sure the RSPCA are well aware of - and humans since the dawn of domesticating and rearing animals; conditioning can take the form of techniques that are not as grisly as those you mention too. Joey123xz (talk) 03:35, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
However, you are still avoiding the FACT that Uxbridge had steadily ruined the British heavy cavalry through the course of the day, that the damage would have been even worse had the D/B "heavies" not helped to rescue the British survivors, that Trip is acknowledged to have performed well on the day, and that Trip was well within his rights as a coalition general to refuse to lead his men to mindless disaster at the whim of an addled Brit. Hence, no court-martial for him. Also, no court-martial for any of the Commonwealth generals who told incompetent British generals to eff-off at various junctures through WW2.
Wdford (talk) 13:34, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
You have obviously ground your axe to a mere nub - no more to say. Urselius (talk) 19:22, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
Glad to be back after a long absence and starting off fresh chat here for 2020. I missed a lively debate here so I'll belatedly add some more food for thought. Disobeying direct orders which are suicidal or seemingly so is nothing inglorious. Following suicidal orders in military history has annihilated entire armies, corps, divisions, battalions, companies - soldiers lives and futures obliterated forever by insanely conceived orders; officers and generals disobeying suicidal orders are not being cowardly nor impertinent; more often is the case is that they are overwhelmed in the act of saving the lives of their soldiers under their command. In WW2 most strikingly, Von Paulus did so at Stalingrad defying Hitler's last stand orders.
At Waterloo, The Scots Greys' commander, Colonel Hamilton, was last observed beseeching the Scots Greys in the valley amidst their shattered French 1st Corps to 'Charge the guns!' of the French 'Grand Battery' on the ridge above them instead of smartly ordering the then well-numbered Greys back to their own lines; obeying this ambitious* order the Greys were practically decimated in that legendary charge; the subsequent numbers of them that recollected for battle thereafter being barely 60 troopers - barely more than 20% of their original strength - practically on the verge of wiped out; though the two Heavies Brigades' numbers built-up considerably by the next day when the unaccounted for troopers returned. The Netherlands Army cavalry officer command of 1815 had a paradox; some officers gaining command based not on experience but social status privilege only, and on the other hand there were the excellent veteran cavalry commanders formerly from service in Napoleon's army. The one advantage French cavalry had over the British was being better led and trained in terms of tactics and discipline. So, it's not hard to imagine the apprehensions of these 'foreigner' commanders rising towards Uxbridge ordering madcap charges at every perceived threat real or imagined.
The French dead were stacked deep at the walls of La Haye Sainte because of dutifully following orders to keep charging futilely against the intact strongpoint - until defenders' ammo ran out and finally the idea of setting the barn roof ablaze by cannons was considered. Let's also take the case of KGL Brigade General Ompetda and his tragic episode later in the day. What is not often mentioned or generally known, is that his infamous suicidal order he obeyed, to support the retreat of survivors of the garrison fleeing La Haye Sainte with his own KGL battalion was actually given by his immediate superior, General Alten. Ompteda emphatically defied the carrying out the order initially - based on the ominous facts of the situation - and thus to save the lives of a whole battalion of his soldiers. Alten quickly brought the Prince of Orange into the desperate dispute. The Prince firmly sided with Alten, for whatever his reason, and obliged the destitute Ompteda to carry out the order; worse - the order was to attack in line despite the very well known threat of sudden French cavalry attacks materializing from concealing gentle folds in the valley terrain below Ompetda's position on the ridge. So duty to obey an order prevailed and Omteda simply marched knowingly to his and the battalion's doom - overwhelmed in moments as predicted by a shocking French cavalry charge.
An actual cavalry charge is a short dash usually spurting from a horse-march or gallop. They would get easily blown after a couple of hours of charges and the draining melees that may ensue. At Waterloo the horses were ridden uphills, over sodden wheat-tramples/ mud-clay fields with bodies and cannons to stumble upon; case in point were the decimated Greys who were resigned to endure the rest of the battle in a few local counterattacks but mostly carbine duels with French cavalry no doubt too equally blown to charge at them too; I'd assume the Household Brigade's subsequent charges during/ after the French cavalry charges were limited to short bursts of exhausted galloping.
Though it may not be duty to disobey a suicidal order, a calm officer will often yield to their human side to not destroy their command 'any further' than seems necessary. In another barely mentioned episode of disobeying orders in the battle; the indefatigable La Haye Sainte commander, Major Baring, implored his sheltering sturdy fellow survivors of the former farmhouse siege to stoically move up to the front and continue their fight - but they had had enough; though willing to stay on in their last stand at the farmhouse until untenable, now they considered Baring's desperation too much to tolerate; they defiantly remained in their sheltered position. In some authorian-led armies such disobedience could be a death sentence or near-harsh punishment, but in an army with lesser demons prevailing, commanders-in-chiefs are relegated to wishing or fantasizing such executions of disobedient officers; similar to Napoleon's vociferous rants about General Dupont and his surrender after the battle of Baylen, and against Marmont for the surrender of his forces in 1814 at Paris (actually first connived and instigated by Joseph Bonaparte's 'order' to undertake what Napoleon attributed to as treason but against Marmont instead).
There's a book I'm currently reading called 'Men at Arnhem' by then Major G.Powell commander of C coy 156th Parachute Battalion. He writes a very smart account of his role in the Oosterbeek Perimeter in the 1944 Market Garden debacle. His book is heavily laced with command and leadership arguments intertwined in the hourly rigours and missions he was involved in; often he talks about why orders needed to be carried out and at the same time gave sound arguments about why generals, captains, sergeants would give up on an assigned order rightly or wrongly, logically or not, saving one's command from destruction while may be imperiling the bigger picture ..... Following orders can seem to be a simple construct but it's not in reality..... Joey123xz (talk) 03:35, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

Gentle reminder of WP:NOTAFORUM (Hohum @) 16:04, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

How long do you think that it takes for a blown horse to 'recover its wind'? Between the charge of the British heavies and the next time any of them was actively moving again was over an hour. A blown horse, like any mammal, has an oxygen debt caused by anaerobic respiration. A horse given 30 minutes of rest will be able to move about quite normally again, maybe not as fresh as before exertion, but still capable of a canter or even a gallop. Urselius (talk) 12:02, 6 January 2020 (UTC)

Anglo- or British- or something else entirely[edit]

The term "Anglo-allied" is used throughout the article. "Anglo-" very simply is an adjective denoting "English". The sovereign state in question with whom other states were allied was Britain. The Kingdom of England had ceased to exist over a century before. If, as claimed, sources use the term "Anglo-" in this context (all of them?), it doesn't make it any less inaccurate and doesn't mean we are obliged to prepetuate the error; cf. the common misuse of Russian- instead of Soviet-, regarding that state in that period of history. I know that, for example and on the rare occasion it happens, BBC journalists are rapped over the knuckles if using Anglo- when they mean British-.

"British" is used throughout the article, and in much greater abundance. Surely it's better for consistency of terminology, as well as of clarity of meaning, to maintain this throughout.

That said, both "Anglo-allied" and "British-allied" are pretty clunky terms and perhaps a neater one should be used anyway. The term seems to be being employed solely to denote which army is being referred to, not specifically to denote the prominence of one state's armies in that force. "Coalition" (or "Seventh Coalition") migh be able to be used but because of the ambiguity of the term I'm unclear if it is being employed in the article, and consistently, to denote coalition forces that were not Prussian from those that were. The Prussians were, after all, also allies. Was who led the force more defining? Those that know the history better can gauge what may be neater, more accurate, less ambiguous. Would it be correct to say, I don't know "British-led" "Wellington-led", something else? "Anglo-allied" doesn't fit the bill on a number of counts. Mutt Lunker (talk) 13:02, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

As an encyclopedia, Wikipedia must conform to usage in the body of relevant literature - as this is the English Language Wikipedia, this needs to be usage in English Language sources. They overwhelmingly use the construct "Anglo-allied" when referring to the army led by Wellington, mostly for the reasons outlined by yourself regarding the Prussians. As editors we cannot ignore usage and impose our own opinion, however logical it might be. That is the bottom line. Urselius (talk) 14:19, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
There is also plenty of more general usage where "Anglo-" is used as a synonym for "British-" or "UK-" - Anglo-American, Anglo-Indian, Anglo-Dutch Wars, Anglo-Boer War - obviously not everyone associated with these was English. One of my gt-grandfathers fought in the Anglo-Boer War, and he was most definitely Irish. Urselius (talk) 14:32, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
In that case, if this is a standard terminology, we should indeed use it but because of the likely confusion from its inaccuracy and ambiguity, the terminology should be clarified in the article. I'd be fine with that.
This would apply equally to any other articles where a standard usage is ambiguous, confusing or inaccurate, if it isn't clarified therein already. Mutt Lunker (talk) 14:50, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
Or just link to Anglo, where it's use cases are explained? (Hohum @) 15:26, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
Linking to an article doesn't alert anyone that the term may mean something other than what they think. Even if someone does follow the link, at best it may make them wonder which usage is being employed, if they chance upon that part of the large article; it won't tell them which usage. And it doesn't address the aspect of Prussia also being an ally. Having the inaccuracy and ambiguity clarified in the article in one or two sentences would deal with it. Mutt Lunker (talk) 15:45, 6 September 2019 (UTC)
Perhaps we should simply explain the composition of the "allied" army in the lead section, and clarify the relationship to the Prussian army? It will cost one extra sentence. Wdford (talk) 19:39, 6 September 2019 (UTC)

To "a British-led allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and a Prussian army under the command of Field Marshal Blücher" insert ", conventionally referred to by historians as the "Anglo-allied army" after the word "Wellington"? The term could be reffed there or in the Armies section of the article. Mutt Lunker (talk) 10:17, 7 September 2019 (UTC)

I was thinking more along these lines:
A French army under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated by two of the armies of the Seventh Coalition: a Prussian army under the command of Field Marshal Blücher, and an army consisting of units from the UK, the German Legion, the Netherlands, Hanover, Brunswick and Nassau, commanded by the British Duke of Wellington and referred to in older sources as the Anglo-allied army.
Accurate, specific, and understandable? Wdford (talk) 14:05, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I see; yes, it's all of those. If it's a term used in older sources, is there a term that newer ones use? Mutt Lunker (talk) 14:30, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I don't have access to many "new" sources, as I mainly use Siborne and Chesney etc. (Chesney uses the term "Allied", and Siborne usually uses "Anglo-Allied"). However per a quick search, Andrew Uffindell and Michael Corum (2002), Alessandro Barbero (2013), Brendan Simms (2014), Gareth Glover (2014), Robert Kershaw (2014), John Hamilton (2014), Alan Forrest (2015) and Nick Lipscombe (2016) all use the term "Allied". Andrew Roberts (2001) and David Zabecki (2014) use the term "Anglo-Allied", and I'm sure you can find others who do likewise. However do they use that term because it is correct, or merely to follow Siborne - or perhaps for nationalistic reasons? Mmmmmmm. Wdford (talk) 15:45, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I imagine for clarity and conciseness. Urselius (talk) 19:24, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
"Allied" would obviously be more concise than "Anglo-Allied". "Allied" would also be more clear than "Anglo-Allied", since the "Anglo" component of the army was less than 40% of the total, and a lot of those were Irish rather than British. All in all, the phrase "Anglo-Allied" is a misnomer and an anachronism, and it should probably be replaced by "Allied" - as many modern authors have done. Wdford (talk) 20:37, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
Not "many". Except for the annoying fact that the Prussians were also part of the alliance - they were also 'allied'. The basic fact is there is no accepted construct other than 'Anglo-' for denoting "Britain or UK connected to something else" - Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Anglo-American. Just like 'Hispano-' also includes the Basques and Catalans etc and in the USA Mexicans, Venezuelans, Cubans, Colombians etc., the use of 'Anglo-' includes the Scots and Welsh and sometimes the Irish, or some of the Irish. To go against linguistic usage is not in the purview of Wikipedia editors. Urselius (talk) 09:18, 8 September 2019 (UTC)here

Current lingistic usage deprecates this archaic view. Why do you have to have a prefix ending in "-o" for supposed neatness if it is deficient in accuracy? It may have been used in the past more widely in literature n this subject, and worthy of a note to that effect but in contemporary usage, to mean "British" it is sloppy, inadequate, inaccurate and, as mentioned, try getting away with it in the BBC and they'll be down on you like a ton of bricks. If it is or was a widespread technical term, it has a place here but there is no reason to perpetuate it with such regularity in this article, particularly as it doesn't add to clarity as to which army is being referred to anyway. As you say "the Prussians... were also 'allied'", they were just as "Anglo-allied", so use of that term adds nothing to clarity. Mutt Lunker (talk) 10:30, 8 September 2019 (UTC)

That is just your opinion. Wikipedia has to reflect reality, not Utopia or Cloud-cuckoo land. Urselius (talk) 11:45, 8 September 2019 (UTC)
And what is the plainly flawed proposition that "there is no accepted construct other than 'Anglo-' for denoting "Britain or UK connected to something else" but yours? Er, "British"? I'm not necessarily advocating its use here, just pointing out your supposed linguistic-usage justification is a dud. Also, I do not dictate the BBC's editorial guidelines; Anglo- is notably no longer accepted, certainly far from universally. There may well be an argument to apply this term here if it is both historically and currently the accepted one as a technical term, though others have cast doubt. Yes, historically it has attached itself as a prefix to various terms but do not bring in spurious, unsupported, wider arguments about supposed current usage if you do not wish to be challenged on them. Mutt Lunker (talk) 10:20, 10 September 2019 (UTC)
That aspect wouldn't be about a whether anyone was British or not but whether they were English. Arguably and technically the Irish troops were British, as part of that state and apparatus but they were not Anglo-. Neither were the Scots and Welsh, in considerable numbers and in prominence in command. "Allies" is more concise, accurate and less ambiguous and if it is the term large used by current sources, it would seem clearly preferable. It can and ought to be noted that Anglo-allied was formerly the conventional term. Mutt Lunker (talk) 22:00, 7 September 2019 (UTC)
I take your point, Mutt. However my own point is not so much about the definition of "Anglo". My concern is about the very concept of "denoting Britain or UK connected to something else" in this particular context. The British component of the Allied army - even allowing for the broadest Imperial definition of the word "British" - was much less than half of the total strength. Why should the Allied army be labelled as "Britain and also a whole lot of other people"? I understand that Imperial jingoists like Siborne would have done so as a matter of course, and seen nothing wrong with it (as probably applies to a number of jingoists today as well). However we now live in the 21st century, where imperialism is gone, the British Empire is reduced now to just Northern Ireland and the Falkland Islands, and modern historians are more inclined to take a neutral stance and use neutral words. Surely in the 21st century we should be following neutral modern sources and using a sentence such as "an Allied army drawn from various nationalities, commanded by the British Duke of Wellington"? Wdford (talk) 13:00, 9 September 2019 (UTC)
Irish Duke of Wellington - there's a huge monument in Phoenix Park, Dublin commemorating him - notably not destroyed by the IRA, unlike Nelson's Column, commemorating an Englishman, in the same city. Urselius (talk) 10:22, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
I don't necessarily agree with every point made there but I do agree with the concluding sentence. Mutt Lunker (talk) 10:10, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

Pointless discussion - Wikipedia has to reflect scholarship and the real world, it does not and cannot innovate, create neologisms or lead opinion. Urselius (talk) 10:22, 12 September 2019 (UTC)

I used the term "British Duke" in the broadest Imperial sense. However I take the point – perhaps "Anglo-Irish Duke" would be better?
It is however well known that Wellesley was a member of the Protestant Ascendancy and a product of Eton, he did not consider himself to be Irish, and he frequently said nasty things about Irish people. When he was awarded a peerage he chose a title in England rather than Ireland.
Of the monument in Phoenix Park, we should note that it was put in Phoenix Park because the residents around the originally-proposed site (the place of his birth) objected to its presence, and that it took 40 years to build because the Irish people refused to pay for it. The fact that the IRA hasn't blown it up yet means nothing – the IRA hasn't blown up lots of other things either.
Modern scholarship tends to describe Wellington's army as "Allied", despite the different term used by Imperialist authors such as Siborne. Wikipedia should reflect that modern scholarship, and the real world.
I propose therefore that the sentence should read "an Allied army drawn from various nationalities, commanded by the Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington".
Wdford (talk) 16:58, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
The majority of modern scholarship in my extensive collection of books on the subject uses "Anglo-allied", I refute your claim to the contrary. The problem of the use of "Allied" in description of Waterloo is that the Prussians were also in the alliance, and were thus also allied. The construction "Ango-allied", clunky as it is, was used by generations of historians, and is still in general use, precisely to overcome this problem. Urselius (talk) 18:08, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
If we are going to take a poll of usages, then we need to accept - and disclose - that there is no consensus on this, and we need to record both usages in the article. I suspect that "generations of historians" used the term Anglo-Allied more for nationalistic reasons than for clarity, and many of them strove to claim the victory as a British achievement rather than an alliance achievement.
I am happy to use in the lead, the sentence "an Allied army drawn from various nationalities, commanded by the Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington and referred to by some authors as the Anglo-Allied army".
Agreed? Wdford (talk) 18:24, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
The full sentence would then read as follows: "A French army under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte was defeated by two of the armies of the Seventh Coalition: a Prussian army under the command of Field Marshal Blücher, and an army consisting of units from the UK, the German Legion, the Netherlands, Hanover, Brunswick and Nassau, commanded by the Anglo-Irish Duke of Wellington and referred to by some authors as the Anglo-allied army." Wdford (talk) 18:28, 12 September 2019 (UTC)
The 'German Legion' reference in that current start line should be properly and accurately corrected to 'the King's German Legion' Joey123xz (talk) 14:42, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
UK, the German Legion, the Netherlands, Hanover, Brunswick and Nassau inaccurately suggests that the German Legion is a country or a geography, because all the others listed are. The KGL was from the UK and was part of the British army. The proposed Anglo-Irish Duke suggests either that there was an Anglo-Irish ducal title of nobility, which is inaccurate, or that Wellington was Anglo-Irish, which is inaccurate (what sources call him this?), while failing to refer to Napoleon as "Franco-Corsican".89.207.1.20 (talk) 16:57, 8 January 2020 (UTC)

Refinement and Clarifications[edit]

Over the years I've enjoyed the endless passions of many here in 'Talk' in pursuit of as near as possible perfection of this article. Seems like we may be getting close to the mountain top. Starting off 2020, I think we have much further to chew on this year in discussing refinements involving important minute corrections and trimming unnecessary excesses of detail which seem to overburden certain sections and unbalance others in the process. I'll layout my summary of suggestions which some of you may further expand upon in new separate sections.
-- In the Introduction mention should be made in brackets that the Netherlands Kingdom army was actually composed of both Dutch and Belgian troops - ie, "..... the Netherlands Kingdom army (Dutch and Belgian troops)....... "

Another possible alternative to 'Anglo-Allied' army debate; often one sees "Army of the Low Countries" referring to Wellington's 1815 army in Belgium. Should that be mentioned too - it seems appropriate to add as a contemporary reference of the times.Joey123xz (talk) 15:54, 7 January 2020 (UTC)

-- The Prelude section should add a line or two mentioning Napoleon chose to strike at Belgium because of its close proximity favourable to a surprise attack - and knowing the massive weight of the rest of the coalition armies could only arrive to the war front weeks away from mid-June. -- Also in the Prelude section there's a significant mistake regarding Ney and Quatre-Bras; Ney's assignment was to capture the Quatre-Bras crossroads and if possible head up to Brussels in Napoleon's wishful thinking; the section implies Ney first hit Perponcher's defending unit at Quatre Bras and that it was then "..... gradually driven back by overwhelming numbers of French troops" - in fact Ney's advance first hit the Dutch Belgians many miles south of Quatre Bras, around the Frasnes area - from their a bold fighting withdrawal was conducted by the Nassau troops facing the largely drawn out French advance. Only a squadron of Guard Lancers had probed as far as the Quatre Bras crossroads but was turned back promptly by the Dutch-Belgian defenders there. The rest of Ney's command was strung out in its advance and prudence convinced Ney not to probe further as dusk settled on June 15th as the Nassau and Dutch-Belgian units at the crossroads and adjacent Bossu woods made a spirited enough show of force. Another significant mistake exists - related to the previous error: Omission of the date of 'June 16th' and the actual reference of the 'Battle of Quatre Bras'. It's implied that Ney probed and fought for Quatre-Bras on June 15th only and that Wellington arrived on the 15th and fought Ney to a standstill and then drove him back by nightfall of the 15th - because the next paragraph starts of with "Meanwhile, on June 16...."

Ney's orders were to secure the crossroads of Quatre Bras, so that he could later swing east and reinforce Napoleon if necessary. Ney found the crossroads of Quatre Bras lightly held by the Prince of Orange, who repelled Ney's initial attacks but was gradually driven back by overwhelming numbers of French troops. First reinforcements, and then Wellington arrived. He took command and drove Ney back, securing the crossroads by early evening, too late to send help to the Prussians, who had already been defeated.[citation needed] Meanwhile on 16 June, Napoleon.....

Another mistake in the Prelude section needs to be corrected as it claims erroneously that ".....the Prussians did not retreat to the east, along their own lines of communication." - In fact though the excellent Prussian generalship did manage to coordinate a retreat of the beaten Prussian army northward to Wavre on the night of the 16th, there was a significant flow of Prussian deserters that headed eastward - along their existing lines of communications. The significance of that point as 'we' know can not be understated enough and should be referenced for the average reader of the article. In the fog of war and literal mists of reduced visibility in the late day torrential rainstorms of June 17th, Grouchy's wing was mesmerized by the fact that his scouts could not immediately determine if the Prussians were illogically moving north or expectedly heading east after their pounding defeat at Ligny. The reasonably-deceptive Prussian mass desertion flight to the east disrupted any hope of Grouchy being the sword into Blucher's back moving northward as Napoleon desired by pinning the Prussians wholly in warding off the French pursuers. This episode potentially changed the whole campaign 'game' at that stage - as did many other intriguing episodes.

--In the Armies section, an injustice has been made regarding the Prussian artillery in referring to their role as "..... did not give its best performance—guns and equipment continued to arrive during and after the battle." Indeed, at Ligny the Prussian gunners surely took a heavy toll on the direct assaults of the French attackers whose losses were significant by the end of the battle. On June 17th their cohesion was near-miraculous - the Prussian batteries remaining largely intact and a significant force in getting to Wavre.

This is just opinion. Which Prussian batteries that fought at Ligny made it to Waterloo in time to contribute? None roughly. The Prussians who arrived at Waterloo were mainly IV Corps which was sent ahead of I and II Corps because they were too beaten up to fight. The latter arrived later. I Corps attacked Wellington's army and it was this Prussian artillery that shot up Mercer's G Troop. II arrived behind IV Corps, whose artillery overs were still landing on the Brussels road when Wellington's advance arrived as far south as Plancenoit, showing the French were still fighting in Plancenoit long after Wellington broke their line.89.207.1.20 (talk) 17:21, 8 January 2020 (UTC)
Opinions aside, evidence shows they put their best performance into the battle as possible; Adkin's estimates that the Prussian actual artillery presence and actually participating in the battle was for; IV Corps - 86 guns : I Corps - 24 guns (with another 58 not arriving in time) : II Corps - 24 guns (with another 48 guns not arriving in time) . Barberro puts IV guns in action at Waterloo at 88. General Muffling's memoirs states that IV Corps did not begin its attack into the French Right until the Corp's guns were ready in position to start its bombardment. The Prussian I Corps confusion of the few friendly fire incidents were with blue-coated Nassau defenders and British Dragoons - much like it would be out of order to claim Picton's Highlanders attacked Wellington's army when their friendly fire mistake shot down several of Merlen's Dutch-Belgian cavalry at Quatre-Bras. Blucher had broken the French Right Wing in conjunction with Wellington's General advance breaking the French Left-Center. Joey123xz (talk) 18:17, 11 January 2020 (UTC)


--In the Battlefield section and later in the Hougoumont section, a crucial error is made by not properly and simply describing Hougoumont as a complex of many buildings; chateau, barns, staff houses, large woods to its front, etc,.... instead the consistent impression given is that Hougoumont was one building ( 'a house' 'a country house') and a chapel, with an orchard.

--In the Preparation section there is fuel for an interesting new section that I don't think has been touched yet - the debate about Napoleon's reference to the attack on Mont St.Jean.
"At 11:00, Napoleon drafted his general order: Reille's Corps on the left and d'Erlon's Corps to the right were to attack the village of Mont-Saint-Jean and keep abreast of one another. This order assumed Wellington's battle-line was in the village, rather than at the more forward position on the ridge.[46] "
In fact there is nothing to prove Napoleon did not exactly mean what he said. The debate assumes Napoleon on one hand might have meant capturing La Haye Sainte and the crossdroads. Napoleon knew precisely where La Haye Sainte was in full view and that a true strategic victory would indeed be controlling the village of Mont St Jean- deep in the center of Wellington's position. The mention of Napoleon assuming wrong should be omitted because his order as written makes perfect sense and was never disputed as an error by his staff.

The Hougoumont section could use some refinement: first should be a brief description of the position being more full. The current vagueness implies that the position was just a large country house and does not signify why this position was an imposing defensive bastion. It should be described as a complex of large buildings surrounded by a large woods, garden walls, orchards, and long ditch lines. The reference to " The Coldstream Guards and the Scots Guards arrived to support the defence. " should be properly described as "Further elements of the British Guards Brigade located nearby in the main line arrived to support the defence.... ". Also, references to Adam's brigade seem disjointed; Perhaps simply adding, something akin to "throughtout the day Wellington was obliged to feed in further reinforcements to stabilize the defence of Hougoumont sending in British, Hanoverian and Brunswick troops from infantry brigades in the vicinity". As well the reference to the French shell fire on Hougoumont "resulting in the destruction of all but the chapel...." is factually wrong - the spreading fires did destroy many buildings but not all - the Great Barn remained standing but untenable, and the Gardener's house was still significantly defensible. A few factual mistakes exist in this statement:
Hougoumont was a part of the battlefield that Napoleon could see clearly,[57] and he continued to direct resources towards it and its surroundings all afternoon (33 battalions in all, 14,000 troops). Similarly, though the house never contained a large number of troops
Though Napoleon could see the woods and tops of the building roofs at Hougoumont, he could never see the defenders there - particularly after the big fire and ensuing clouds of smoke erupted at the position. General Reille committed at most two of his three infantry divisions to directly assault Hougoumont (22 battalions, around 10,000 infantry, II Corps batteries). Bachelu's 5th Infantry Division had a very late day role in a somewhat pithy attack nearby but not against Hougoumont.

--The Grand Battery section could be refined further;
The grande batterie was too far back to aim accurately, and the only other troops they could see were skirmishers of the regiments of Kempt and Pack, and Perponcher's 2nd Dutch division (the others were employing Wellington's characteristic "reverse slope defence").[61][h] Nevertheless, the bombardment caused a large number of casualties. Although some projectiles buried themselves in the soft soil, most found their marks on the reverse slope of the ridge. The bombardment forced the cavalry of the Union Brigade (in third line) to move to its left, as did the Scots Greys, to reduce their casualty rate.
The 'grand batterie' should be labeled 'Grand Batterie'. It was not too far back at all ' it was located well within 'effective range' of Wellington's center, and maximum range of most of Wellington's second line. It could not aim accurately as such because of higher terrain of the opposite crestline and Wellington hiding his troops wisely atop or below that crestline. Perhaps simplification is best in referring to 'the only Allied formations skirmishers and batteries being visible while directly across from the battery the bulk of General Picton's two British infantry divisions and General Bylandt's Dutch-Belgian Infantry brigade amidst them sheltered behind the Ohain ridge crestline. The British Heavy Cavalry 'Union' Brigade' was itself compelled to shift its position forward to reduce mounting casualties from the cannon fire being lobbed indirectly over the ridge.'

In the First French infantry attack section, a couple of points. Durette's division did not attack as one mass nor against the Ohain ridge directly; it splintered against the village/ farmhouse complexes in the east defended by Saxe Weimer's brigade- that should be mentioned simply.

In the British Heavy Cavalry charge area: An error - it's claimed the scattered British Heavies were caught by the French cavalry's counter-countercharge to the west of La Haye Sainte when in fact they were demolished to the EAST of La Ha Haye Sainte below the Grand Batterie. I'm also assuming, given how far Jacquinot's cavalry positions were on the French right, that Napoleon only had time to order the cuirassiers to counter-attack; it would be more logical to assume that the French lancers devastating flank attack was independently launched at the same moment. If such orders to Jaquinot exist it should be cited. It also should be clarified that survivors of the Union Brigade made clear references to their decimated post-charge numbers. Though the unit still functioned, their numbers were skeletal at best; as with all other similarly decimated units at Waterloo, many 'lost' in the battle did rejoin their units the next day - post battle lower official losses on units differing from in battle high unit attrition reductions in other words. Contrary to the claim that the Greys put 'very many' French guns out of action, I think a citation should be made referring to this 'claim' at best since the French gunners were even firing into the backs of the retreating Scots Greys- not to mention that the cannonade even worsened into the day. As well - last last line mentioning Prussian Muffling's 3 pm assessment is out of place in this section by about one hour past the event.

The typical frontage occupied by a foot artillery piece was 20 yards so an 80-gun battery would have had a frontage of a mile. The Greys were about 250 to 300 strong in two lines so would have had a frontage of about 150 to 200 yards. Obviously they were not about to put out of action 'very many' of a battery that was far wider than their own lines. The claim should be understood as their sabring 'very many' of those they attacked, which on the basis of their frontage might have been 10 to 15 of them.89.207.1.20 (talk) 17:14, 8 January 2020 (UTC)
Further to your point, it seems the Greys were in 3 separate elements having gone down into the valley in their attack. The first element dashed off out of control to overwhelm an area of the Batterie led by Col.Hamilton. A second element gathered around General Ponsonby and other officers, failed in its desperation to rally the Greys in general, and then in its turn went off eastward to attack a portion of Durette's infantry and his supporting guns. The third element were those rallying and/or ushering hordes of prisoners back into Allied lines. Joey123xz (talk) 18:26, 11 January 2020 (UTC)
We know, because of eyewitness accounts, that the Scots Greys and the Royals were reorganised from an initial three squadrons before their charge, to two squadrons, slightly less definite evidence suggests that the Iniskillings were similarly reorganised. This is not a handful of men. Cavalry commanders had a good idea of what numbers made a viable squadron. Urselius (talk) 20:26, 5 January 2020 (UTC)
What is generally known on this point is evidence available from surviving Scots Greys cavalrymen involved in the episode.
Sergeant Archibauld Johnston was in Major Poole's troop of the Greys and left a detailed campaign account of his participation in it. In his observations of the immediate aftermath of the charge's rally back in their own lines;
"The few who providentially escaped the slaughter endeavoured to make the ground from which we commenced to charge, which when done they could not I think that this was either the body of the brigade or regiment, for all that were left of the Greys were about 60 rank & file. In fact the whole brigade at the time did not exceed 130 rank & file effective men and horses, the remainder were either killed, wounded, or conducting prisoners to Brussels &c."
Glover, Gareth (2010). The Waterloo Archive. Volume 1: British Sources ; section 15 "Journal by Sergeant Archibauld Johnston" (source from National Museum of Scotland M1997.4).
Then there is the famous passage of the account by Corporal Dickson of the Greys which in its conclusion he noted;
".....Major Cheney (who had five horses killed under him) was mustering our men, and with him were Lieutenant Wyndham (afterwards our colonel) and Lieutenant Hamilton, but they were both wounded. There were scarcely half a hundred of the Greys left out of the three hundred who rode off half an hour before."
Out of around 400+ who started in battle -and minus the numbers of troopers lost during the pre-attack bombardment, the regiment itself lost over 80% of its effective strength during the charge; a mere handful rallied to continue on the rest of the day. Though fighting units in battles can be referred to as battalions, companies, etc, often is the case in a heavy conflict that these formations are actually shadows of what the full compliments of those formations would ordinarily be. At Waterloo many front line units were similarly decimated; ie, Halkett's British brigade's battalions as they were, could only field company sized strengths by day's end. Similarly, the reformation of the Union Brigade regiments after their charge were by evidence skeletal strength squadrons rather than full strength sized units.Joey123xz (talk) 15:54, 7 January 2020 (UTC)
At 6 O'clock, Quintus Von Goeben of the 3rd Hussars KGL describes the Scots Greys as being 2 squadrons strong, in line with his own regiment. Be very careful in differentiating: 1) The immediate aftermath of the charge, when many troopers may not have found their regiment again 2) after the regiments had been reorganised, and 3) later in the battle when all the British heavies had taken many, many more casualties. Goeben states that the Greys when they were in line with his own regiment "took considerable losses with great cold-bloodedness" from the carbine fire of enemy cavalry skirmishers. To imagine that any commander would make two squadrons of 30 men each, from a total of 60, rather than forming one squadron is quite ludicrous. The only casualty figures taken of any regiment were for the battle as a whole. The sum of all descriptions of the actions of the regiments of British heavies after their charge shows that they initially, following reorganisation, had sufficient numbers for them to make effective charges, these charges were described by eye-witnesses, and also all accounts state that the heavies took continuing very heavy losses. If your baseless claim that the Greys had lost 80% of their strength in their first charge were true, their remnant would have been capable of nothing and equally have been incapable of taking further "considerable losses" as they would have already ceased to have the numbers for 'further losses' be a meaningful concept. Urselius (talk) 17:25, 7 January 2020 (UTC)
Actually, it's not me you're trying to argue with. I simply presented long-standing facts regarding the surviving totals of the Scots Greys returning from the charge against D'Erlon. Who you need to convince as being "baseless" are the two Scots Greys who survived the charge and gave corroborating accounts of the immediate aftermath back in their own lines; 50-60 Greys reassembled - out of the 400+ who attacked > close to 80% not returning. If you can cite sources supporting your claim by stating actual numbers ( not types of reconstituted units, ie, squadrons / troops etc ) contending the two Greys' records, then you have a debate to base upon, because the two Greys I quoted make no mention of their Regiment numbers swelling by 200 returning troopers - if that's what your idea of the Greys recovering by two full squadrons implies. I do not contend with the fact that small units of British cavalry were still potently devastating; the Household Brigade made it's crushing charge against D'Erlon's infantry and supporting cavalry with four regiments numbering each just above only 200 troopers! So, effectively, I'm convinced the few hundred cavalry left in the Union and Household Brigades from 3 pm on, were capable of launching effective local counter attacks.Joey123xz (talk) 18:26, 11 January 2020 (UTC)


In the Capture of La Haye Sainte area I think it should be pointed out that it was General Alten who ordered Colonel Ompteda to make the fateful attempted covering attack towards La Haye Sainte. The Prince of Orange in direct command of both officers, 'merely' and firmly obliged Ompteda to obey Alten.

The Attack of the Imperial Guard section could use a few simplified clarifications. The attack description is not specific in noting that the Middle Guard split into two separate attacks: One branch heading to the center and initially cracking it before being halted by part of Halkett's decimated brigade and then being wrecked by Gen.Detmers Dutch-Belgian infantry brigade's devastating counter-charge just after his attached artillery had blasted into the stunned Guardsmen; the other branch being in two separate forces hitting Maitland's Guards further west and this episode being more highlighted since as the big climactic turning event of the day as Maitland and Adam destroyed these attacks - the way Detmers brigade had done in his sector moments earlier - it should be noted how far Detmer's counter attack went- sweeping all the way down to La Haye Sainte. A witness from the British 52nd Light (Leeke) mentions his unit in its sweep across Mont St.Jean spotted mysterious infantry units to his left; little did he know that these formed masses of blue coated troops were not French battalions as he feared, - logically they were some of units of Chasse's Dutch-Belgian Division which had earlier swept away the first attack of Middle Guards in that sector. Such clarification would unmuddle what seems to be an excess of hodge-podge details.

The Middle Guard did not exist in 1815. The Old Guard regiments were grenadiers and chasseurs. Middle Guard regiments comprised one each of Fusilier-Chasseurs and Fusilier-Grenadiers. They were formed in 1806 and disbanded in 1814. Neither unit was reactivated in 1815. The Guard at Waterloo was Young and Old, no Middle, and was described as such by Davout.89.207.1.20 (talk) 17:07, 8 January 2020 (UTC)
I agree - technically you are right about that. It's a point that's been discussed here in previous sections, and of course elsewhere. Though the 'Middle Guard' infantry did not exist by the 1815 official Army designation, it was and has been since known as that body of French Guard infantry by definition in reference to them during the Waterloo Campaign. As you know it was not similar to the previous Grand Armee years of the official organization of the Middle Guard in size and uniforms.
Napoleon stated - according to the 1949 De Chair autobiography of selected Napoleon's collected memoirs
"…I ordered General Friant to go with these four battalions of the Middle Guard to meet the enemy's attack. The four battalions repulsed everybody that they encountered….Ten minutes later, the other battalions of the Guard arrived."
Marshal Ney in his written recollections, does make mention of the final Imperial Guard attack at Waterloo;
"A short time afterwards, I saw four regiments of the Middle Guard advancing, led on by the Emperor....."Joey123xz (talk) 18:17, 11 January 2020 (UTC)


In the French disintegration section - the 'abandoned carriage' implies Napoleon had just fled from it according to the myth around 'it'. There were in fact two carriages and the capturer, Keller bluffed his way into reward riches implying this carriage was 'the one'. By his own claim, Napoleon pointed out that he fled the battlefield only by horseback. His carriages and drivers had been left to their own ill-fared fates in the rout.

As part of the epilogue, could a section be started on the very significant Waterloo 200 event?
Joey123xz (talk) 18:20, 5 January 2020 (UTC)

I've heard it in more than a few history books that the deserters from Ligny were confusing the hell out of the French. Then again it is never mentioned that the General Staff had people that collected the deserters and had them marching back to join their formations shortly thereafter. As for the Prussian artillery, the point was it did survive and was present on the battlefield. As for Peter H's comment on it, It did not show the flexibility that the French did at Ligny. Clausewitz was fairly caustic in his evaluation of the Prussian army's performance on Ligny. Now Karl could get a bit testy about such things. He was known to be both sensitive and petulant at times. None the less the army was not displaying the command and control that he expected of the army. You might read his comments on it and see what you think. Much of the training expected had not been completed and too many of the units were green. Reading through the comments, my evaluation was that of the three armies on the Waterloo battlefield, Prussia fielded the worst on a unit scale. Because of the General Staff, on the operation scale, it proved to be the fastest marching and most flexible. The old infantry regiments were still some of the best on the Waterloo battlefield. But many of the cavalry and artillery formations were not up to their optimal level.
I agree with the comment about the roads. The road network influenced every single action taken by all three armies before, during, and after, the battle. There were exactly three roads that were worth anything in the area, everything else was a road in name only. Described as I have read them, they would at best be called logging roads and at worst cart trails. In 1815 a road was a hideously expensive proposition requiring hellish amounts of maintenance work to keep it up to shape. It wasn't in much better shape over on Elsenborn 104 miles due east in WW2. That aspect of the battle is seriously underplayed. Regards Tirronan (talk) 08:22, 9 January 2020 (UTC)
Yes- I agree about the roads; the paved ones were few and far between; secondary unpaved roads must have been a literal washout in storms. I'd like to see though and out of curiosity, evidences of how the Prussian artillery did not perform at its best performance as claimed in the article. It's for other forums I suppose, to reference details on how Blucher's units effectiveness was/ may have been eroded by the earlier Spring Saxon mutiny, and many of the best Prussian army units not yet in the theater of operations area..... Happy New Year btw, to you and othersJoey123xz (talk) 18:17, 11 January 2020 (UTC)

On the 18th they performed miracles- arriving at Waterloo in daylong movement through atrocious ground sodden / road-wrecked terrain / flooded streams - reminiscent of films/photos of WW1 horse artillery crews struggling in mud. Upon deploying at Waterloo their long range bombing struck the center of Napoleon's positions - the French Imperial Guard itself; surely convincing Napoleon that significant distraction was necessary to divert on the looming Prussian arrival threat on his right flank. Give credit where it's due - the Prussian artillery performed significantly well despite the many obstacles they encountered.

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